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Abstract
Foreign exchange markets regularly display severe bubbles. This paper explores
whether or not so-called target zone interventions are an effective tool for central banks
to stabilize the exchange rate. We define such intervention operations as buying/selling
an undervalued/overvalued currency when the distance between the exchange rate and
its fundamental value exceeds a critical threshold value. On the basis of a non-linear
empirical exchange rate model with chartists and fundamentalists, we find that target
zone interventions not only have the power to reduce misalignments but also earn
profits.
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1 Introduction
Since exchange rates directly affect international competitiveness and the performance
of national economies, they are arguably the world economy’s most important prices.
Unfortunately, foreign exchange markets do not seem to be very efficient. For example,
Johansen and Sornette (2003) detect significant bubbles and crashes in the DEM/USD
and JPY/USD market. It is therefore not surprising that central banks try to stabilize
foreign exchange markets. However, the empirical evidence is ambivalent about the
usefulness of intervention operations (Neely 2001). The aim of this paper is to examine
this issue from a theoretical perspective.
In a number of studies by, e.g., Day and Huang (1990), Kirman (1991), de
Grauwe, Dewachter and Embrechts (1993), Brock and Hommes (1998), LeBaron,
Arthur and Palmer (1999), Lux and Marchesi (2000), Farmer and Joshi (2002),
Chiarella and He (2002), or Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini (2003) it is argued that
financial market dynamics is mainly driven by the interaction between heterogeneous
agents, so-called chartists and fundamentalists. As vividly expressed by Hommes
(2001), financial markets may be viewed as evolutionary systems between different
competing trading strategies. Strategies that have performed well in the past have a
higher market impact than their worse performing competitors. As it turns out, technical
and fundamental trading rules may coexist in speculative markets, implying that
technical analysis may survive natural selection pressure. Intricate price dynamics arise
due to the fact that the impact of the trading strategies changes endogenously over time.
For instance, if the popularity of fundamentalism decreases, bubbles are likely to occur.
Wieland and Westerhoff (2004) thus explore whether chaos control methods
may help central banks to stabilize exchange rate dynamics. Using the prototype non-
linear chartist-fundamentalist model of Day and Huang (1990) they find that certain3
control algorithms such as the OGY method, named after Ott, Grebogi and Yorke
(1990), indeed have the power to reduce exchange rate variability and misalignments,
even if the dynamics is considerably polluted by noise. Interestingly, some of these
algorithms are related to actual central bank intervention rules: The OGY method may
be interpreted as a more sophisticated version of the “targeting long-run fundamentals
rule”, which is often carried out by central banks (Neely 2001).
The study by Wieland and Westerhoff (2004) should be regarded as preliminary,
since several interesting aspects remain open. First, to conduct chaos control methods,
one typically needs a priori knowledge on the system’s equations. Such information
may in general be retrieved from time series information, yet in the case of foreign
exchange markets, this requirement appears to be rather hard. Second, the derived
intervention rules basically suggest intervening every period (i.e. every day). But policy
makers may not want to manipulate the exchange rate so regularly. As reported by
LeBaron (1999) and Saacke (2002), the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bundesbank
intervened together in the DEM/USD market in the period between 1979 and 1996 in
one day in four. At other times, they were not active so often. Third, the parameters of
the exchange rate’s law of motion have been set such that it can mimic characteristic
bull and bear markets. Although this is a common procedure, the results would be more
reliable if the parameters were directly estimated from empirical data.
In this paper, we seek to address these three issues by investigating the
effectiveness of a robust low-frequency intervention heuristic within an empirical
exchange rate model recently developed by Westerhoff and Reitz (2003). The main
engine of the dynamics of their chartist-fundamentalist setup is that fundamentalists
become less active the more the exchange rate disconnects from its fundamental value.
The underlying intuition is that fundamentalists lose confidence in their strategy when4
they have mispredicted the direction of the exchange rate change. The structure of the
model is backed up by the data: Via a STAR GARCH procedure, significant parameter
estimates with correct signs are derived for major currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar.
This paper focuses on target zone interventions which imply buying/selling an
undervalued/overvalued currency when the distance between the exchange rate and its
fundamental value exceeds a critical threshold value. To make the rule as simple and
robust as possible, we fix the central bank’s actual per period intervention volume. Note
that this mechanism is different from the historical European currency system. There the
authorities have stopped the exchange rate from leaving a certain exchange rate band. In
our model, interventions start when the exchange rate leaves a specified target zone.
Within the band, the central bank is indifferent to the path of the exchange rate.
We find that intermittent target zone interventions apparently suffice to reduce
misalignments in foreign exchange markets. Suppose the central bank sets a target zone
of ±8 percent around the fundamental value. Taking our estimates literally, the model
predicts the following: To reduce the distortion by about 50 percent, the central bank
has to intervene on average only every 40 trading days. In addition, the intervention
strategy seems to be profitable. By buying low and selling high, the relation of profits to
the total intervention volume is close to 10 percent. The intervention works as follows:
It directly shifts the exchange rate towards its fundamental value, chartists amplify this
new exchange rate trend, and more fundamentalists are encouraged to become active.
By coordinating the behavior of chartists and fundamentalists, the temporary
intervention effect is likely to become a permanent one.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly recall the empirical
exchange rate model of Westerhoff and Reitz (2003) and in section 3, we explore the
effectiveness of target zone interventions. The final section concludes the paper.5
2 A simple empirical chartist-fundamentalist model
2.1 Motivation
The chartist-fundamentalist approach is based on the observation that financial market
participants use simple technical and fundamental trading strategies to take their
investment decisions (Frankel and Froot 1987). While technical analysis identifies
trading signals out of past price movements, fundamental analysis predicts prices to
return to fundamentals. The nature of technical analysis tends to be destabilizing
whereas the nature of fundamental analysis is stabilizing. The interplay between
positive and negative feedback rules may cause complex price dynamics. Some studies
exploit the nonlinearity of the agents’ trading rules (e.g. Day and Huang 1990). Within
other contributions the market impact of the rules changes over time (e.g. Brock and
Hommes 1998). The fact that these models are able to replicate the stylized facts of
financial markets quite well is seen as a kind of empirical validation.
Let us briefly review the model of Westerhoff and Reitz (2003). The exchange
rate adjusts via a log-linear price impact function: Excess buying drives the exchange
rate up, and excess selling drives it down. The orders of chartists positively depend on
the most recent exchange rate trend and the demand of fundamentalists is proportional
to the mispricing. A constant number of chartists is always active in the market, but the
market impact of fundamentalists is time-dependent. Most importantly, if the exchange
rate disconnects from its fundamental value, fundamentalists lose their confidence in the
usefulness of their trading rule and consequently abstain from trading. If misalignments
decrease, as predicted by fundamental analysis, they re-enter the market. Misalignments
are furthermore conditioned on volatility. Without fluctuations, convergence is not
possible. Hence, if exchange rate volatility declines, fundamentalists expect mean
reversion to be less likely.6
Estimations based on daily data for major currencies indeed reveal that the more
the exchange rate deviates from its fundamental value, the more fundamentalists leave
the market. The model indicates that foreign exchange markets become increasingly
unstable during bubbles. The diminishing force of fundamentalists alone may therefore
not suffice to bring exchange rates back in line. A natural question which arises is
whether central bank interventions may help to deflate bubbles.
2.2 Setup
The model is estimated via a STAR GARCH procedure developed by Lundbergh and
Teräsvirta (1998). In technical terms, the model consists of a mean equation, a smooth
transition variable and a standard GARCH (1,1) volatility equation
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t . According to (1), the change in the log exchange
rate  S depends on the orders of chartists (first term), the orders of fundamentalists
(second term) and a random element (third term).  C a  and  F a  stand for positive
reaction coefficients of chartists and fundamentalists, respectively. The fundamental
value is denoted by F. The transition variable W takes into account that the impact of
fundamentalists diminishes with increasing misalignments and decreasing volatility. A
simple GARCH (1,1) model is used to update the volatility.7
2.3 Estimation results
The fundamental value is approximated by the purchasing power parity (henceforth
ppp). For daily spot DEM/USD exchange rates over the period from 1980 to 1996 the
model’s parameters are estimated as follows:
03 . 0 = C a , 004 . 0 = F a ,  035 . 0 = b , 0000011 . 0 1 = c , 069 . 0 2 = c , 909 . 0 3 = c .
All coefficients are of the correct sign and statistically significant, at least at the 5
percent level. Similar results are obtained for GBP/USD and JPY/USD exchange rates
(see Westerhoff and Reitz 2003 for more details).
Figure 1 illustrates the working of the model. The first panel displays daily log
DEM/USD exchange rates (solid line) and ppp data (dashed line). Both time series are
normalized to zero at 1990, assuming that ppp holds at the beginning of the 1990s. The
second panel shows the estimated impact of fundamentalists. The lasting US dollar
bubble in the mid 1980s is accompanied by a deep fall in confidence in fundamental
analysis. In particular, the impact of fundamentalists dropped below 10 percent when
the dollar peaked in mid 1985. The third panel depicts the evolution of changes in log
exchange rates (i.e. the returns). Periods of low volatility clearly alternate with periods
of high volatility, which is typical for financial markets (Lux and Ausloos 2002).
---------- Figure 1 goes about here ----------
Using (1) – (3) and the above parameters, we can, of course, produce artificial
time series. Figure 2 contains a simulation run over 5000 observations. The first, second
and third panels again present log exchange rates, weights of fundamentalists and
returns, respectively. For simplicity, we have set the fundamental value constant (F=0).
The dynamics in figure 2 resembles the dynamics in figure 1. For instance, the
exchange rate circles in a complex way around its fundamental value and bubble
periods coincide with periods in which fundamental analysis is unpopular. Exactly8
when the stabilizing impact of fundamentalists is most needed, mean reversion pressure
is low so that the mispricing may gain additional momentum. The bottom panel reveals
that the model has the potential to produce volatility clustering. Further diagnostic tests
also confirm that the returns are serially uncorrelated and that the distribution of the
returns is non-normal, i.e. it possesses fat tails.
---------- Figure 2 goes about here ----------
3 Target zone interventions
3.1 Specification
The previous section suggests that foreign exchange markets are inherently unstable.
Bubbles may not end endogenously but may need external force such as random trade
or new information. Such external stimulus may also be injected by central banks. Next,
we try to present a simple robust low-frequency intervention method suitable for this
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where d is a fixed intervention size and e defines the range of the target zone. Suppose,
for instance, that e=0.2. Then policy makers do not intervene as long as the distance
between the exchange rate and its fundamental value is lower than 20 percent. If the
exchange rate is misaligned more than 20 percent, then they either sell (S>F) or buy
foreign currency (S<F). The intervention variable  CB
t D 1 −  is added to the right-hand side
of (1), else the system remains as before.
We measure the success of this method with the help of four statistics. The
distortion in the market is computed as the average absolute distance between the log9
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The first term of (6) captures what the accumulated position of the central bank is worth
after period T while the second term keeps track of the gains and losses due to
individual interventions. The frequency of intervention is just given as the number of











,                                                                                                      (7)
where 1 = t I  for  0 ≠ CB
t D  and 0 = t I  for  0 = CB
t D . The total amount of interventions
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An important goal of the central bank should be to reduce distortion. In addition, the
central bank may also look at the profits, the frequency and the total amount of
intervention operations.
3.2 Example
Let us start the analysis by inspecting an example. The first, second and third panels of
figure 3 show a simulation run of log exchange rates, weights of fundamentalists and
target zone interventions, respectively. Figure 3 can be directly compared with figure 210
since it is based on the same seed of random variables. The difference in the dynamics
is solely a result of the behavior of the central bank. The interventions are carried out
with strength d=0.01 when the distance between the log exchange rate and its log
fundamental value exceeds e=0.08.
The results are remarkable. The exchange rate now fluctuates much closer to its
fundamental value, although the central bank trades only once in a while. In numerical
terms, the distortion decreases from about 0.084 to 0.037. The central bank becomes
active 125 times in 5000 periods (i.e. in 2.5 percent of the trading days). Moreover, the
interventions are profitable and the central bank’s net position appears rather balanced.
The method works as follows. The intervention has a direct effect on the course
of the exchange rate, i.e. it pushes the exchange rate towards its fundamental value. By
inducing such a trend, additional orders of chartists are triggered which further guide the
exchange rate back towards its fundamental value. In addition, the confidence of
fundamentalists in their trading strategy increases, i.e. more stabilizing fundamentalists
are active on average (see the central panel of figure 3). Note that whenever the
exchange rate converges towards it fundamental value, both chartists and
fundamentalists trade in the same direction. One may thus say that target zone
interventions help coordinate the expectations of heterogeneous agents.
---------- Figure 3 goes about here ----------
Note that coordinated behavior may lead to stronger exchange rate changes.
However, the exchange rate moves in the direction of the fundamental value. Such a
volatility-enhancing strategy may clearly be intended by central banks (for an empirical
account see Hung 1997). But it makes sense to halt this mechanism for two reasons.
First, the central bank may not want to manipulate the exchange rate in every period.
Second, coordination of chartists and fundamentalists close to the fundamental value is11
prevented. The central banks may take care of these issues by selecting an appropiate
target zone.
3.2 A Monte Carlo analysis
To evaluate the success of target zone interventions, a more general kind of analysis is
needed. Figure 4 shows how the statistics react to an increase in the intervention size.
All estimates are computed as averages over 10 simulation runs with 5000 observations
each. The intervention size d is increased in 20 discrete steps from 0 to 0.01. The target
zone is e=0.08 and the remaining parameters are as in section 3.2.
Target zone interventions are in fact a powerful instrument to stabilize foreign
exchange markets. For an intervention size of d=0.01, the distortion is reduced by
around 50 percent, although the policy makers only trade in about 2.5 percent of the
cases. Moreover, interventions earn profits. Compared to the total amount of
intervention, they may be as large as 10 percent. Our study also suggests that when
central authorities decide to intervene, they should do it rather forcefully. If the
intervention size is low, they have to intervene much more frequently, yet the outcome
is still not as good.
---------- Figure 4 goes about here ----------
Are these results robust with respect to different target zones? Figures 5 and 6
display the findings for bands with e=0.04 and e=0.12, respectively. Overall, the results
are qualitatively the same as in figure 4. We again see a reduction in the distortion and
positive profits. However, the smaller the target zone, the lower the distortion, and the
higher the profits, but also the more frequent the interventions. For instance, for e=0.04
and d=0.01, the central bank intervenes on average every 17 periods and thereby drives
the distortion down to 2 percent.12
---------- Figure 5 and 6 go about here ----------
A final comment seems to be in order. Our results are apparently not far away
from what some central banks have done in the past. Inspecting actual intervention data
from the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bundesbank, LeBaron (1999) and Saacke
(2002) conclude that the interventions produced profits. Neely (2001), who conducted a
survey study among monetary authorities regarding their intervention practice in the
1990s, concludes that interventions are quite common in foreign exchange markets. The
percentage of business days on which they report having intervened, ranged from 0.5
percent to 40 percent, with 4.5 percent being the median. In addition, policy makers
indicated that they seek to return the exchange rate to fundamental values. 
1
4 Conclusions
Can central bank interventions control the cyclical behavior of exchange rates? Using an
empirical chartist-fundamentalist exchange rate model in which the market impact of
fundamentalists depends on the strength of their belief in fundamental analysis, we find
that low-frequency target zone interventions are not only profitable but also manage to
reduce distortions considerably. Such an intervention is executed when the exchange
rate leaves a pre-specified band around the fundamental value and works as follows. It
directly drives the exchange rate towards its fundamental value, the new exchange rate
trend is amplified by chartists, and fundamentalists are encouraged to take larger
positions. In other words, the stabilizing direct effect of the intervention is amplified
and prolonged since it stimulates additional uniform trades of chartists and
fundamentalists.
                                                
1 Given the evidence presented here, it is surprising that the European Central Bank has remained quite
inactive since the launch of the Euro, especially with respect to the Euro’s extreme cyclical course.13
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Figure 1: The first panel displays daily log DEM/USD exchange rates (solid line) and
ppp data (dashed line) for the period 1980-1996. Both time series are normalized to zero
at 1990, assuming that ppp holds at the beginning of the 1990s. The second panel shows
the estimated weights of the fundamentalists, whereas the third panel depicts the
evolution of the returns.16
Figure 2: The first, second and third panels present a simulation run of log exchange
rates, weights of fundamentalists and returns, respectively. The parameter setting is as
in section 3.2, 5000 observations.17
Figure 3: The first, second and third panels show a simulation run of log exchange rates,
weights of fundamentalists and target zone interventions, respectively. The same
simulation design is used as in figure 2, but d=0.01 and e=0.0818
Figure 4: The four panels reveal the impact of increasing intervention sizes d on the
distortion, the profitability of interventions, the frequency of interventions, and the total
amount of interventions, respectively. All estimates are averages over 10 simulation
runs with 5000 observations each. The intervention size d is increased in 20 discrete
steps from 0 to 0.01. The target zone is e=0.08. The remaining parameters are as in
section 3.2.19
Figure 5: The four panels reveal the impact of increasing intervention sizes d on the
distortion, the profitability of interventions, the frequency of interventions, and the total
amount of interventions, respectively. The same simulation design is used as in figure 2,
but now e=0.04.20
Figure 6: The four panels reveal the impact of increasing intervention sizes d on the
distortion, the profitability of interventions, the frequency of interventions, and the total
amount of interventions, respectively. The same simulation design is used as in figure 2,
but now e=0.12.